Not only this is useful for the upcoming SPDY support, but it can
also help to improve HTTPS performance by enabling TLS False Start
in Chrome/Chromium browsers [1]. So, we always enable NPN for HTTPS
if it is supported by OpenSSL.
[1] http://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/04/11/falsestart.html
It was added in r2717 and no longer needed since r2721,
where the termination was added to ngx_shm_alloc() and
ngx_init_zone_pool(). So then it only corrupts error
messages about ivalid zones.
This parameter allows to don't require certificate to be signed by
a trusted CA, e.g. if CA certificate isn't known in advance, like in
WebID protocol.
Note that it doesn't add any security unless the certificate is actually
checked to be trusted by some external means (e.g. by a backend).
Patch by Mike Kazantsev, Eric O'Connor.
OCSP response verification is now switched off by default to simplify
configuration, and the ssl_stapling_verify allows to switch it on.
Note that for stapling OCSP response verification isn't something required
as it will be done by a client anyway. But doing verification on a server
allows to mitigate some attack vectors, most notably stop an attacker from
presenting some specially crafted data to all site clients.
This includes the ssl_stapling_responder directive (defaults to OCSP
responder set in certificate's AIA extension).
OCSP response for a given certificate is requested once we get at least
one connection with certificate_status extension in ClientHello, and
certificate status won't be sent in the connection in question. This due
to limitations in the OpenSSL API (certificate status callback is blocking).
Note: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() was reimplemented as it doesn't
allow to access the certificate loaded via SSL_CTX.
Very basic version without any OCSP responder query code, assuming valid
DER-encoded OCSP response is present in a ssl_stapling_file configured.
Such file might be produced with openssl like this:
openssl ocsp -issuer root.crt -cert domain.crt -respout domain.staple \
-url http://ocsp.example.com
The directive allows to specify additional trusted Certificate Authority
certificates to be used during certificate verification. In contrast to
ssl_client_certificate DNs of these cerificates aren't sent to a client
during handshake.
Trusted certificates are loaded regardless of the fact whether client
certificates verification is enabled as the same certificates will be
used for OCSP stapling, during construction of an OCSP request and for
verification of an OCSP response.
The same applies to a CRL (which is now always loaded).
Support for TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols was introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.1
(-beta1 was recently released). This change makes it possible to disable
these protocols and/or enable them without other protocols.
The following config caused segmentation fault due to conf->file not
being properly set if "ssl on" was inherited from the http level:
http {
ssl on;
server {
}
}
enabled in any server. The previous r1033 does not help when unused zone
becomes used after reconfiguration, so it is backed out.
The initial thought was to make SSL modules independed from SSL implementation
and to keep OpenSSL code dependance as much as in separate files.
and is shared among all hosts instead of pregenerating for every HTTPS host
on configuraiton phase. This decreases start time for configuration with
large number of HTTPS hosts.
*) test ssl_client_certificate for ssl_verify_client
*) $ssl_client_cert adds TAB before each line except first one
*) $ssl_client_raw_cert contains certificate as is
*) Feature: the $ssl_client_serial variable.
*) Bugfix: in the "!-e" operator of the "if" directive.
Thanks to Andrian Budanstov.
*) Bugfix: while a client certificate verification nginx did not send
to a client the required certificates information.
*) Bugfix: the $document_root variable did not support the variables in
the "root" directive.
*) Feature: the "dav_access" directive.
*) Feature: the "if" directive supports the "-d", "!-d", "-e", "!-e",
"-x", and "!-x" operators.
*) Bugfix: a segmentation fault occurred if a request returned a
redirect and some sent to client header lines were logged in the
access log.
*) Feature: the "stub" parameter in the "include" SSI command.
*) Feature: the "block" SSI command.
*) Feature: the unicode2nginx script was added to contrib.
*) Bugfix: if a "root" was specified by variable only, then the root
was relative to a server prefix.
*) Bugfix: if the request contained "//" or "/./" and escaped symbols
after them, then the proxied request was sent unescaped.
*) Bugfix: the $r->headers_in("Cookie") of the ngx_http_perl_module now
returns all "Cookie" header lines.
*) Bugfix: a segmentation fault occurred if
"client_body_in_file_only on" was used and nginx switched to a next
upstream.
*) Bugfix: on some condition while reconfiguration character codes
inside the "charset_map" may be treated invalid; the bug had
appeared in 0.3.50.
*) Feature: the "ssl_verify_client", "ssl_verify_depth", and
"ssl_client_certificate" directives.
*) Change: the $request_method variable now returns the main request
method.
*) Change: the ° symbol codes were changed in koi-win conversion
table.
*) Feature: the euro and N symbols were added to koi-win conversion
table.
*) Bugfix: if nginx distributed the requests among several backends and
some backend failed, then requests intended for this backend was
directed to one live backend only instead of being distributed among
the rest.
*) Feature: the ngx_http_dav_module supports the MKCOL method.
*) Feature: the "create_full_put_path" directive.
*) Feature: the "$limit_rate" variable.
