The only consumer is a callback function for SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback()
deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0. Now the function is conditionally compiled too.
The latest HTTP/1.1 draft describes Transfer-Encoding in HTTP/1.0 as having
potentially faulty message framing as that could have been forwarded without
handling of the chunked encoding, and forbids processing subsequest requests
over that connection: https://github.com/httpwg/http-core/issues/879.
While handling of such requests is permitted, the most secure approach seems
to reject them.
The c->read->ready and c->write->ready flags might be reset during
the handshake, and not set again if the handshake was finished on
the other event. At the same time, some data might be read from
the socket during the handshake, so missing c->read->ready flag might
result in a connection hang, for example, when waiting for an SMTP
greeting (which was already received during the handshake).
Found by Sergey Kandaurov.
Previously, when cleaning up a QUIC stream in shutdown mode,
ngx_quic_shutdown_quic() was called, which could close the QUIC connection
right away. This could be a problem if the connection was referenced up the
stack. For example, this could happen in ngx_quic_init_streams(),
ngx_quic_close_streams(), ngx_quic_create_client_stream() etc.
With a typical HTTP/3 client the issue is unlikely because of HTTP/3 uni
streams which need a posted event to close. In this case QUIC connection
cannot be closed right away.
Now QUIC connection read event is posted and it will shut down the connection
asynchronously.
After receiving GOAWAY, client is not supposed to create new streams. However,
until client reads this frame, we allow it to create new streams, which are
gracefully rejected. To prevent client from abusing this algorithm, a new
limit is introduced. Upon reaching keepalive_requests * 2, server now closes
the entire QUIC connection claiming excessive load.
The "hq" mode is HTTP/0.9-1.1 over QUIC. The following limits are introduced:
- uni streams are not allowed
- keepalive_requests is enforced
- keepalive_time is enforced
In case of error, QUIC connection is finalized with 0x101 code. This code
corresponds to HTTP/3 General Protocol Error.
Previously, in-flight byte counter and congestion window were properly
maintained, but the limit was not properly implemented.
Now a new datagram is sent only if in-flight byte counter is less than window.
The limit is datagram-based, which means that a single datagram may lead to
exceeding the limit, but the next one will not be sent.
Previously, the error was ignored leading to unnecessary retransmits.
Now, unsent frames are returned into output queue, state is reset, and
timer is started for the next send attempt.
As per quic-http-34:
Endpoints SHOULD create the HTTP control stream as well as the
unidirectional streams required by mandatory extensions (such as the
QPACK encoder and decoder streams) first, and then create additional
streams as allowed by their peer.
Previously, client could create and destroy additional uni streams unlimited
number of times before creating mandatory streams.
OpenSSL is known to provide read keys for an encryption level before the
level is active in TLS, following the old BoringSSL API. In BoringSSL,
it was then fixed to defer releasing read keys until QUIC may use them.
The directive enables usage of UDP segmentation offloading by quic.
By default, gso is disabled since it is not always operational when
detected (depends on interface configuration).
To improve output performance, UDP segmentation offloading is used
if available. If there is a significant amount of data in an output
queue and path is verified, QUIC packets are not sent one-by-one,
but instead are collected in a buffer, which is then passed to kernel
in a single sendmsg call, using UDP GSO. Such method greatly decreases
number of system calls and thus system load.
Additionally, the ngx_init_srcaddr_cmsg() function is introduced which
initializes control message with connection local address.
The NGX_HAVE_ADDRINFO_CMSG macro is defined when at least one of methods
to deal with corresponding control message is available.
The ngx_wsasend_chain() and ngx_wsarecv_chain() functions were
modified to use only preallocated memory, and the number of
preallocated wsabufs was increased to 64.
Sometimes, QUIC packets need to be of certain (or minimal) size. This is
achieved by adding PADDING frames. It is possible, that adding padding will
affect header size, thus forcing us to recalculate padding size once more.
In d1bde5c3c5d2, the number of preallocated iovec's for ngx_readv_chain()
was increased. Still, in some setups, the function might allocate memory
for iovec's from a connection pool, which is only freed when closing the
connection.
The ngx_readv_chain() function was modified to use only preallocated
memory, similarly to the ngx_writev_chain() change in 8e903522c17a.
Renamed header -> field per quic-qpack naming convention, in particular:
- Header Field -> Field Line
- Header Block -> (Encoded) Field Section
- Without Name Reference -> With Literal Name
- Header Acknowledgement -> Section Acknowledgment
Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) and space are not expected to appear
in the Host header. Requests with such characters in the Host header are
now unconditionally rejected.
In 71edd9192f24 logging of invalid headers which were rejected with the
NGX_HTTP_PARSE_INVALID_HEADER error was restricted to just the "client
sent invalid header line" message, without any attempts to log the header
itself.
This patch returns logging of the header up to the invalid character and
the character itself. The r->header_end pointer is now properly set
in all cases to make logging possible.
The same logging is also introduced when parsing headers from upstream
servers.
Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f), space, and colon were never allowed in
header names. The only somewhat valid use is header continuation which nginx
never supported and which is explicitly obsolete by RFC 7230.
Previously, such headers were considered invalid and were ignored by default
(as per ignore_invalid_headers directive). With this change, such headers
are unconditionally rejected.
It is expected to make nginx more resilient to various attacks, in particular,
with ignore_invalid_headers switched off (which is inherently unsecure, though
nevertheless sometimes used in the wild).
Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) were never allowed in URIs, and must
be percent-encoded by clients. Further, these are not believed to appear
in practice. On the other hand, passing such characters might make various
attacks possible or easier, despite the fact that currently allowed control
characters are not significant for HTTP request parsing.
From now on, requests with spaces in URIs are immediately rejected rather
than allowed. Spaces were allowed in 31e9677b15a1 (0.8.41) to handle bad
clients. It is believed that now this behaviour causes more harm than
good.
Per RFC 3986 only the following characters are allowed in URIs unescaped:
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
gen-delims = ":" / "/" / "?" / "#" / "[" / "]" / "@"
sub-delims = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
/ "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
And "%" can appear as a part of escaping itself. The following
characters are not allowed and need to be escaped: %00-%1F, %7F-%FF,
" ", """, "<", ">", "\", "^", "`", "{", "|", "}".
Not escaping ">" is known to cause problems at least with MS Exchange (see
http://nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-ru/2010-January/031261.html) and in
Tomcat (ticket #2191).
The patch adds escaping of the following chars in all URI parts: """, "<",
">", "\", "^", "`", "{", "|", "}". Note that comments are mostly preserved
to outline important characters being escaped.
