Previously, the expression (ch & 0x7f) was promoted to a signed integer.
Depending on the platform, the size of this integer could be less than 8 bytes,
leading to overflow when handling the higher bits of the result. Also, sign
bit of this integer could be replicated when adding to the 64-bit st->value.
Previously errors led only to closing streams.
To simplify closing QUIC connection from a QUIC stream context, new macro
ngx_http_v3_finalize_connection() is introduced. It calls
ngx_quic_finalize_connection() for the parent connection.
The function finalizes QUIC connection with an application protocol error
code and sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with type=0x1d.
Also, renamed NGX_QUIC_FT_CONNECTION_CLOSE2 to NGX_QUIC_FT_CONNECTION_CLOSE_APP.
Previously dynamic table was not functional because of zero limit on its size
set by default. Now the following changes enable it:
- new directives to set SETTINGS_QPACK_MAX_TABLE_CAPACITY and
SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS
- send settings with SETTINGS_QPACK_MAX_TABLE_CAPACITY and
SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS to the client
- send Insert Count Increment to the client
- send Header Acknowledgement to the client
- evict old dynamic table entries on overflow
- decode Required Insert Count from client
- block stream if Required Insert Count is not reached
Client streams may send literal strings which are now limited in size by the
new directive. The default value is 4096.
The directive is similar to HTTP/2 directive http2_max_field_size.
So that connections are protected from failing from on-path attacks.
Decryption failure of long packets used during handshake still leads
to connection close since it barely makes sense to handle them there.
A previously used undefined error code is now replaced with the generic one.
Note that quic-transport prescribes keeping connection intact, discarding such
QUIC packets individually, in the sense that coalesced packets could be there.
This is selectively handled in the next change.
The patch removes remnants of the old state tracking mechanism, which did
not take into account assimetry of read/write states and was not very
useful.
The encryption state now is entirely tracked using SSL_quic_read/write_level().
quic-transport draft 29:
section 7:
* authenticated negotiation of an application protocol (TLS uses
ALPN [RFC7301] for this purpose)
...
Endpoints MUST explicitly negotiate an application protocol. This
avoids situations where there is a disagreement about the protocol
that is in use.
section 8.1:
When using ALPN, endpoints MUST immediately close a connection (see
Section 10.3 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]) with a no_application_protocol TLS
alert (QUIC error code 0x178; see Section 4.10) if an application
protocol is not negotiated.
Changes in ngx_quic_close_quic() function are required to avoid attempts
to generated and send packets without proper keys, what happens in case
of failed ALPN check.
quic-transport draft 29, section 14:
QUIC depends upon a minimum IP packet size of at least 1280 bytes.
This is the IPv6 minimum size [RFC8200] and is also supported by most
modern IPv4 networks. Assuming the minimum IP header size, this
results in a QUIC maximum packet size of 1232 bytes for IPv6 and 1252
bytes for IPv4.
Since the packet size can change during connection lifetime, the
ngx_quic_max_udp_payload() function is introduced that currently
returns minimal allowed size, depending on address family.
quic-tls, 8.2:
The quic_transport_parameters extension is carried in the ClientHello
and the EncryptedExtensions messages during the handshake. Endpoints
MUST send the quic_transport_parameters extension; endpoints that
receive ClientHello or EncryptedExtensions messages without the
quic_transport_parameters extension MUST close the connection with an
error of type 0x16d (equivalent to a fatal TLS missing_extension
alert, see Section 4.10).
This is a temporary workaround, proper retransmission mechanism based on
quic-recovery rfc draft is yet to be implemented.
Currently hardcoded value is too small for real networks. The patch
sets static PTO, considering rtt of ~333ms, what gives about 1s.
Also, if both are present, require that they have the same value. These
requirements are specified in HTTP/3 draft 28.
Current implementation of HTTP/2 treats ":authority" and "Host"
interchangeably. New checks only make sure at least one of these values is
present in the request. A similar check existed earlier and was limited only
to HTTP/1.1 in 38c0898b6df7.
The flags was originally added by 8f038068f4bc, and is propagated correctly
in the stream module. With QUIC introduction, http module now uses datagram
sockets as well, thus the fix.
