Previously, in-flight byte counter and congestion window were properly
maintained, but the limit was not properly implemented.
Now a new datagram is sent only if in-flight byte counter is less than window.
The limit is datagram-based, which means that a single datagram may lead to
exceeding the limit, but the next one will not be sent.
Previously, the error was ignored leading to unnecessary retransmits.
Now, unsent frames are returned into output queue, state is reset, and
timer is started for the next send attempt.
As per quic-http-34:
Endpoints SHOULD create the HTTP control stream as well as the
unidirectional streams required by mandatory extensions (such as the
QPACK encoder and decoder streams) first, and then create additional
streams as allowed by their peer.
Previously, client could create and destroy additional uni streams unlimited
number of times before creating mandatory streams.
OpenSSL is known to provide read keys for an encryption level before the
level is active in TLS, following the old BoringSSL API. In BoringSSL,
it was then fixed to defer releasing read keys until QUIC may use them.
The directive enables usage of UDP segmentation offloading by quic.
By default, gso is disabled since it is not always operational when
detected (depends on interface configuration).
To improve output performance, UDP segmentation offloading is used
if available. If there is a significant amount of data in an output
queue and path is verified, QUIC packets are not sent one-by-one,
but instead are collected in a buffer, which is then passed to kernel
in a single sendmsg call, using UDP GSO. Such method greatly decreases
number of system calls and thus system load.
Additionally, the ngx_init_srcaddr_cmsg() function is introduced which
initializes control message with connection local address.
The NGX_HAVE_ADDRINFO_CMSG macro is defined when at least one of methods
to deal with corresponding control message is available.
The ngx_wsasend_chain() and ngx_wsarecv_chain() functions were
modified to use only preallocated memory, and the number of
preallocated wsabufs was increased to 64.
Sometimes, QUIC packets need to be of certain (or minimal) size. This is
achieved by adding PADDING frames. It is possible, that adding padding will
affect header size, thus forcing us to recalculate padding size once more.
In d1bde5c3c5d2, the number of preallocated iovec's for ngx_readv_chain()
was increased. Still, in some setups, the function might allocate memory
for iovec's from a connection pool, which is only freed when closing the
connection.
The ngx_readv_chain() function was modified to use only preallocated
memory, similarly to the ngx_writev_chain() change in 8e903522c17a.
Renamed header -> field per quic-qpack naming convention, in particular:
- Header Field -> Field Line
- Header Block -> (Encoded) Field Section
- Without Name Reference -> With Literal Name
- Header Acknowledgement -> Section Acknowledgment
Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) and space are not expected to appear
in the Host header. Requests with such characters in the Host header are
now unconditionally rejected.
In 71edd9192f24 logging of invalid headers which were rejected with the
NGX_HTTP_PARSE_INVALID_HEADER error was restricted to just the "client
sent invalid header line" message, without any attempts to log the header
itself.
This patch returns logging of the header up to the invalid character and
the character itself. The r->header_end pointer is now properly set
in all cases to make logging possible.
The same logging is also introduced when parsing headers from upstream
servers.
Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f), space, and colon were never allowed in
header names. The only somewhat valid use is header continuation which nginx
never supported and which is explicitly obsolete by RFC 7230.
Previously, such headers were considered invalid and were ignored by default
(as per ignore_invalid_headers directive). With this change, such headers
are unconditionally rejected.
It is expected to make nginx more resilient to various attacks, in particular,
with ignore_invalid_headers switched off (which is inherently unsecure, though
nevertheless sometimes used in the wild).
Control characters (0x00-0x1f, 0x7f) were never allowed in URIs, and must
be percent-encoded by clients. Further, these are not believed to appear
in practice. On the other hand, passing such characters might make various
attacks possible or easier, despite the fact that currently allowed control
characters are not significant for HTTP request parsing.
From now on, requests with spaces in URIs are immediately rejected rather
than allowed. Spaces were allowed in 31e9677b15a1 (0.8.41) to handle bad
clients. It is believed that now this behaviour causes more harm than
good.
Per RFC 3986 only the following characters are allowed in URIs unescaped:
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
gen-delims = ":" / "/" / "?" / "#" / "[" / "]" / "@"
sub-delims = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
/ "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
And "%" can appear as a part of escaping itself. The following
characters are not allowed and need to be escaped: %00-%1F, %7F-%FF,
" ", """, "<", ">", "\", "^", "`", "{", "|", "}".
Not escaping ">" is known to cause problems at least with MS Exchange (see
http://nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-ru/2010-January/031261.html) and in
Tomcat (ticket #2191).
The patch adds escaping of the following chars in all URI parts: """, "<",
">", "\", "^", "`", "{", "|", "}". Note that comments are mostly preserved
to outline important characters being escaped.
HTTP clients are not allowed to generate such requests since Transfer-Encoding
introduction in RFC 2068, and they are not expected to appear in practice
except in attempts to perform a request smuggling attack. While handling of
such requests is strictly defined, the most secure approach seems to reject
them.
No valid CONNECT requests are expected to appear within nginx, since it
is not a forward proxy. Further, request line parsing will reject
proper CONNECT requests anyway, since we don't allow authority-form of
request-target. On the other hand, RFC 7230 specifies separate message
length rules for CONNECT which we don't support, so make sure to always
reject CONNECTs to avoid potential abuse.
Previously, TRACE requests were rejected before parsing Transfer-Encoding.
This is not important since keepalive is not enabled at this point anyway,
though rejecting such requests after properly parsing other headers is
less likely to cause issues in case of further code changes.
After 2096b21fcd10, a single RST_STREAM(NO_ERROR) may not result in an error.
This change removes several unnecessary ctx->type checks for such a case.
As per quic-http-34, these are the cases when this error should be generated:
If an endpoint receives a second SETTINGS frame
on the control stream, the endpoint MUST respond with a connection
error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED
SETTINGS frames MUST NOT be sent on any stream other than the control
stream. If an endpoint receives a SETTINGS frame on a different
stream, the endpoint MUST respond with a connection error of type
H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED.
A client MUST NOT send a PUSH_PROMISE frame. A server MUST treat the
receipt of a PUSH_PROMISE frame as a connection error of type
H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED; see Section 8.
The MAX_PUSH_ID frame is always sent on the control stream. Receipt
of a MAX_PUSH_ID frame on any other stream MUST be treated as a
connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED.
Receipt of an invalid sequence of frames MUST be treated as a
connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED; see Section 8. In
particular, a DATA frame before any HEADERS frame, or a HEADERS or
DATA frame after the trailing HEADERS frame, is considered invalid.
A CANCEL_PUSH frame is sent on the control stream. Receiving a
CANCEL_PUSH frame on a stream other than the control stream MUST be
treated as a connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED.
The GOAWAY frame is always sent on the control stream.
The quic-http-34 is ambiguous as to what error should be generated for the
first frame in control stream:
Each side MUST initiate a single control stream at the beginning of
the connection and send its SETTINGS frame as the first frame on this
stream. If the first frame of the control stream is any other frame
type, this MUST be treated as a connection error of type
H3_MISSING_SETTINGS.
If a DATA frame is received on a control stream, the recipient MUST
respond with a connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED.
If a HEADERS frame is received on a control stream, the recipient MUST
respond with a connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED.
Previously, H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED had priority, but now H3_MISSING_SETTINGS has.
The arguments in the spec sound more compelling for H3_MISSING_SETTINGS.
